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Abstract 
 
In the United States, power system works at 99.9 percent reliability but it does not imply that it is safe and reliable against all 
types of hazards whether natural, technological or man-made. Especially the high impact low probability (HILP) events also 
called “black-swan events” offer a complex risk environment for power grid infrastructure. On the other hand, the utility 
companies have to work in a very competitive and regulated environment maintaining a balance between their investments on 
infrastructure, rate of returns, serviceability and cost to the customers. Hence, it is not economically feasible and justifiable to 
harden the entire infrastructure owing to budget constraint and regulatory issues. In such a scenario, enhancing resilience 
selectively within the power grid infrastructure would serve the purpose of achieving optimum security against any type of 
hazards, including HILP events. Resilience is the property that incorporates robustness and rapid recovery of infrastructure in 
face of any type of unprecedented havoc hazards. Enhancing resilience is cost intensive and future return on such investments 
are also risky and uncertain. Again, “resilience investments” i.e. investments needed to enhance resilience of power grid need 
approval from Public Utility Commissions (PUC) for cost recovery from public consumers and also must involve other 
investment agencies to invest in the power infrastructure by offering them good rates of return on investment (ROI). This 
paper will discuss the various key issues that hinder adequate investments in resilience enhancement of power grid 
infrastructure. Some of the key issues identified are (i) lack of knowledge about the Black Swan Events and their impact on 
the power grid infrastructure; (ii) strict regulatory restrictions imposed by PUC within the purview of which the utilities work; 
(iii) lack of strong value proposition for resilience investment business cases as presented by the utilities to the PUC, and (iv) 
lack of adequate incentives for the investors to invest in the power infrastructure. A conceptual strategic decision making 
framework for the PUC is also proposed that would help in approving or incentivizing adequate resilience investments for 
power grid infrastructure. 
 
© 2015 Sayanti Mukhopadhyay. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under organizing committee of 
I3R2 2015 
 
Keywords: Power grid infrastructure; Decision support system; Resilience investment; Black-swan events; Economic impact 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Power Grid Infrastructure (PGI) is the cornerstone of our society. It is one of the most 
important of the lifeline infrastructures that is expected to provide services even if the other 
infrastructures fail [1], [2] . The continuity in electricity services is an absolute necessity because 
without electricity, all the essential services of the society such as continuous business and 
government operations, public health and safety, and national and economic safety will be disrupted 
leading to extensive economic loss. In the United States, although the power system works at 99.9 
percent reliability, it does not imply that the power infrastructure is safe against all types of hazards 
whether natural, technological or man-made. Especially the high impact, low probability (HILP) 
events offers a very complex risk environment for the infrastructure [3].  
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The HILP events which are also known as “Black Swan Events” are considered to be the instigating 
events that could cause cascading failure of the power infrastructure and consequent disruption in the 
electric services to such an extent that the restoration of services back to ex-ante disaster condition 
might take weeks, months or sometimes even years [4]. Co-ordinated physical or cyber-attacks and 
geomagnetic disturbances are a few examples of such HILP events when the PGI is considered.  
In addition to these external threats, there is a growing internal weakness within the PGI 
systems caused by several factors that further renders vulnerability to the entire system when exposed 
to such external threats. Examples of some of these factors include aging of the PGI and the increased 
interdependency of all the other critical infrastructure sectors on the power sector. The increased 
interdependency introduces fragility to the network structure of PGI [5]. In addition, owing to the 
climate change, there is an increased frequency of natural disasters which disrupt the power generation 
and delivery in many instances and thus weaken the power delivery service. For example, increased 
droughts reduces power generation from the steam power plants leading to scarcity of power; the 
storms, hurricanes and tornadoes, on the other hand, physically disrupts the power transmission and 
distribution systems. 
Under such circumstances, it is extremely important to protect the national grid and enhance 
its security in face of the Black Swan Events. Fortunately, electricity service providers understand the 
importance of reliability of the power system and its need for proper functioning of the society and 
economy and they take every initiative to maintain/improve reliability of the grid. The North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) defines operating reliability as “the ability of the 
electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short circuits or unanticipated loss 
of system components” and it defines adequate reliability as “the ability of the electric system to supply 
the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times, taking 
into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components” [6]. It is 
noteworthy here, that the “reliability” property of the electric system is not capable of assessing the 
unscheduled and extraordinary unexpected outage risks and thus this property alone is not able to 
enhance the security of the grid against the Black Swan Events. The reason being these types of events 
create extra-ordinary hazardous risk scenarios that would cause extensive infrastructure damage and 
service disruptions — the estimated extent of damage and disruption being much higher than the 
combined effect of the most severe recent disasters, Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane Katrina in the 
US [7]. 
In this context, the “resilience” of infrastructure seems to play an immense important role. 
Resilience is the property that enhances security of any infrastructure and incorporates robustness and 
and helps in rapid recovery of infrastructure in the face of any type of unprecedented havoc hazards. 
However, enhancing resilience is cost intensive and the future return on such investments are also 
risky and uncertain. Again, “resilience investments” i.e. investments needed to enhance resilience of 
power grid need approval from Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) for cost recovery from the 
electricity consumers and also need good rates of return on their investment (ROI). This paper will 
discuss the various key issues that hinder adequate investments in resilience enhancement of PGI and 
will establish the need that the PUCs must foster the resilience investments as proposed by the utilities. 
Finally this paper presents a framework which will help in the decision making process of the PUCs in 
approving or incentivizing adequate resilience investments for PGI. 
 
Nomenclature 
 PGI Power Grid Infrastructure 
 PUC Public Utility Commission 
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2. Issues related to resilience investments 
Enhancing resilience of the critical infrastructure is an absolute necessity to enhance the 
security of the nation. President Barack Obama signed a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 on 
February 12, 2013 and called for national unity to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures in 
order to strengthen and maintain proper functioning and security of the critical infrastructures for 
maintaining nation’s security, economic prosperity and well-being of the public [8]. However, there 
are several issues related to the resilience enhancement of the PGI mostly because such enhancement 
strategies are costly and need extensive investment for their implementation. In this paper, resilience 
investment is referred to as the investments needed to implement the resilience enhancement strategies 
that are needed to improve the security of the grid. The various issues associated with the resilience 
investments are ့ 
x Lack of knowledge about the Black Swan Events and their impact on the PGI 
x Strict regulatory restrictions within the purview of which the utilities need to work 
x Lack of strong value propositions for resilience investments to the PUCs by the utilities 
x Lack of adequate incentives for the resilience incentives 
 
2.1. Lack of knowledge about the Black Swan Events and their impact on PGI 
The world has witnessed various types of disaster risks all the time but recently it seems that 
the frequency of the occurrence of such disasters is increasing. The Nepal earthquake in 2015, 
Hurricane Sandy in the United States in 2012, the North American Derecho storm in 2012, the East 
African Drought in 2011 and Haiti Earthquake in 2010 are a few of the examples. However, common 
public and the government are not fully aware of the extent of Black Swan Event risks that we are 
facing everyday nowadays [3]. The major reason behind the lack of knowledge and ignorance about 
the Black Swan Events is the extremely low probability of the events to occur. Lee et al. (2012) 
describes the Black Swan Events as the “events which are beyond the realm of normal expectations in 
history, science, finance and technology and therefore impossible or extremely difficult to predict” [3]. 
The preparedness for such events should be generic and on a systemic basis because specific planning 
is almost impossible in these cases. Moreover, with the increased dependency of the society on 
electricity in the recent times, the impacts of a significant disruption within the power grid owing to a 
Black Swan Event will no longer be localized but will flow through the infrastructure network instead 
leading to a cascading failure of all the other interdependent critical infrastructures. Such a 
catastrophic failure can propagate across the jurisdictional and transnational boundaries. Thus it is 
almost impossible to predict how a Black Swan Event will impact the PGI and what consequences will 
it unfold. 
2.2. Strict regulatory restrictions by the Public Utility Commissions (PUC) 
The utility companies that own the PGI have to work in a very competitive and regulated 
environment maintaining a balance between their investments on infrastructure, rate of returns, 
serviceability to the customers and also cost to the customers. Utilities are natural monopolies and in 
that way they are empowered to restrict the output and set prices for the customers at higher levels 
than economically justified in order to earn higher profits. Now, based on the economic principles, it is 
necessary to have a monopoly structure of the utility to satisfy the overall demand at a lower cost 
compared to a number of smaller utilities co-existing in a competitive market [9]. However, on the 
other hand, since utility provides public service it is also important that these utilities are overseen and 
regulated by the government to protect the public interest in receiving a reliable service at an 
affordable price [9]. The government approves the investments to be made by the utilities but 
presently, the procedure that is being followed is biased towards the resilience enhancement 
investments [10]. Approval of investments is extremely important because it is associated with the 
approval of the cost recovery process for the investments which includes charging the customer at a 
higher rate for the enhanced reliability of the electric service that they are enjoying. 
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2.3. Lack of strong value propositions for resilience investments to the PUCs by the utilities 
One of the major issues behind the approval of resilience investments is the lack of strong 
value proposition for investments in building new infrastructure, upgrading the existing infrastructure, 
or implementing innovative technologies that would help to resist or recover rapidly after being 
impacted by a disaster. The several issues behind lack of strong value proposition of a resilience 
investment are as follows. 
x First, there is a common misconception among the utility providers and regulatory commissions 
about the terms “reliability” and “resilience” in context of a power grid. As discussed before, 
reliability can be defined as the ability of the power system to withstand sudden disturbances 
and continue supplying adequate power to the consumers at all times taking into account 
expected and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of the system components [6]; on the 
other hand, resilience of PGI is the ability of the power system to reduce the magnitude and/or 
duration of any disruptive event and restore the power system to its ex-ante reliability state [4]. 
Thus, in this context, it can be easily understood that although the power grid works with 99.9 
percent reliability, it is a common misconception that the grid is also resilient. But, the instances 
of power outages in the U.S. such as North Eastern power outage in 2003, power outage in New 
York City due to Superstorm Sandy in 2012, power outage from North American Derecho in 
2012 and others confirm that incorporating resilience in the power infrastructure has become 
extremely important and reliability does not necessarily confirm that the power grid is also 
resilient.  
 
x Second, most of the resilience building options are cost intensive and when these are combined 
with the uncertainty and low probability of occurrence of such disasters, often times such 
investments seems to be unnecessary. The regulatory commissions are reluctant to approve such 
investments and recover the costs from public by increasing their monthly utility rates as the 
effects from such projects are not to be experienced by the customers immediately. However, 
when the HILP events unfold, the impact is catastrophic and disruption spreads in the 
infrastructure network as a contagious disease causing extensive economic and social loss. Thus 
the expected loss increases in such cases if the infrastructure is not rendered to be resilient and 
this would increase the benefits for the resilience investments. 
 
x The utilities however do not consider such extensive impacts and economic loss at present. The 
existing benefit-cost analysis of the investments protocol consider the value of the lost load for 
the customers at a flat rate i.e., it considers the value of electricity loss to the customers to be 
constant (electricity loss is less than 8 hours) which is not applicable in case of HILP events [10]. 
The Interruption Cost Estimate (ICE) calculator used by the utilities and regulators to estimate 
the cost and benefit of a power interruption while assessing the need for reliability investments 
does not consider the compounding value of the lost kilowatt-hours over time [7]. Under 
instances of longer period (greater than 8 hours) of power outage, the value of the lost power to 
both the residential and non-residential customers are increasing and thus often times the 
economic damage for prolonged power outages are undervalued in the current estimation system 
[10]. Moreover, the compounding value of the economic loss due to business disruption as a 
result of the power loss is also not considered.  
Thus, the present investment analysis framework often times undervalues the resilience 
investment and fails to establish a strong business case to present in front of the public utility 
commissioners. 
2.4. Lack of adequate incentives for resilience investments 
The resilience investments would add value in the long term and under circumstances of HILP 
events. However, the regulatory commissions are reluctant to approve the cost recovery for such 
investments. Thus, it is an extremely risky affair for the utility companies and investors to perform 
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that would be used to enhance the resilience of the power grid. Now, the word “resilience” is being 
widely used in different industries including civil infrastructures, economic systems, sociology, 
physiology and others. However, the meaning of resilience is not same in all the cases. NERC has 
defined the resilience of bulk power system in terms of “adequacy” — ability of the power system to 
supply power to the customers all the time taking into the account the “reasonably expected scheduled 
and unscheduled outages” and “security” — ability to withstand sudden damages [6]. Since this 
definition only focus on the bulk power system, the National Association Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC) defined resilience of the utility as the “robustness and recovery 
characteristics of utility infrastructure and operations, which would avoid or minimize interruptions of 
service during an extraordinary and hazardous event” [10]. In this research, NARUC’s definition of 
utility resilience will be adopted and strategy development phase will only focus on the strategies that 
would increase the resilience of the grid by incorporating robustness and redundancy in the system or 
hardening the critical equipment or help in rapid recovery of the system in case the HILP event affects 
the system.  
4.3. Assessment of economic viability of the strategies: Phase III 
Preliminary screening of the strategies need to be conducted after Phase II to select the set of 
economically viable strategies. Economically viable strategies refer to the strategies whose life-cycle 
cost will be less than the benefits that it will offer over time. The life-cycle cost of the strategies/ 
alternatives will also be obtained from the experts and utility database. The benefits of such strategies 
will be measured in terms of the reduced losses owing to the implementation of the strategies. The 
economic benefits of each strategy can be computed in two steps. The loss estimation which includes 
both the direct and indirect losses are calculated first for the no-strategy scenario and then the same is 
calculated for the scenario considering the implementation of the particular strategy (say Strategy A). 
The difference in the losses will yield the benefit for Strategy A. Finally, those strategies for which the 
economic benefits will be higher than the overall life-cycle cost will be considered as the economically 
viable strategies and thus this will help the decision makers to select the best strategies that would 
enhance the security of the grid. 
5. Expected Outcomes 
The expected outcome of the proposed research is to develop an Integrated Risk-based 
Decision Support System (IRDSS) for the utilities to help them in strategic decision making in 
prioritizing the resilience investments needed to enhance the security of the grid in face of HILP 
events. This would also support them to develop business case for the resilience investments to get it 
approved by the state utility regulators. Such an outcome will also help the PUCs to make better policy 
decisions regarding approving / incentivizing such resilience investments. The specific outcomes from 
this research are as follows: 
x Development of various risk scenarios and corresponding damage levels on the power 
infrastructure due to the impact of a HILP event on the PGI 
x Development of a portfolio of optimized strategies to minimize the impact of HILP events on the 
grid 
x Assessment of benefits of the strategies computed in terms of reduced losses will include — 
 evaluation of the increasing value of lost electricity services over time from customer’s 
perspective 
 assessment of the compounding economic loss caused due to business interruption of the 
interdependent critical infrastructures  
x Estimation of the cost of investment needed to implement the strategies 
x Prioritization of the optimum strategies based on their costs and benefits 
In order to achieve the expected outcomes, some of the assumptions that will be considered in this 
research are as follows: 
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x The research will focus on a single state investor owned utilities 
x Portfolio of strategies will include those strategies that will enhance the resilience of the grid 
x The model will only consider risks of the natural HILP events and not the intentional manmade / 
terrorist attacks. 
6. Conclusion
The resilience enhancement of power grid is of utmost importance to secure the grid in face of 
the HILP events. Resilience enhancement strategies are cost intensive and thus they do not receive 
much attention either from the Public Utility Commissioners (PUCs) or the utilities. Most of the times, 
these types of investments are undervalued at present as they do not consider the compounding value 
of load lost to the customers or the indirect business loss in the other electricty dependent economic 
sectors due to prolonged outages. Moreover, the significant low probability of occurrence of the HILP 
events have further reduced the importance of such resilience investments. The Integrated Risk-based 
Decision Support System (IRDSS) will be able to consider the HILP event risks and analyze the 
different high risk scenarios considering their impact on the PGI and also the economy. Such a system 
will integrate the scenario based risk analysis and the compounding economic loss owing to the PGI 
damage to evaluate the different resilience enhancement strategies. Thus, instead of undervaluing it 
most of the times using the current investment evaluation system, the proposed IRDSS platform will 
help to adequately value the resilience investments and help in the decision making process of the 
PUCs to foster such investments. 
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